Spatial Inequality in Facilitator Workload in Conditional Cash Transfer Implementation: The Farthest Areas Receive the Thinnest Support
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Abstract
Conditional cash transfers depend on field facilitators who inform recipients, verify compliance, and update beneficiary data. This article analyses the implementation of Indonesia's Family Hope Programme (Program Keluarga Harapan, PKH) in a mountainous rural district, focusing on how facilitator workload is distributed across villages. Studies of PKH implementation in Indonesia generally assess implementation factors in aggregate. This descriptive qualitative single case study drew on interviews with the facilitator coordinator and beneficiary families, observation, and documents (April–September 2021), organised by Edwards III's four implementation factors; facilitator workload was then compared with village area and accessibility. Eight facilitators served 1,530 beneficiary families in five villages, with caseloads of 112 to 289 families per facilitator. The two largest villages (about 3,800 ha each) had one facilitator each, who carried the heaviest loads (289 and 254 families; 494 and 442 benefit components). Thus, 25% of facilitators served 35.5% of beneficiary families across 53.2% of the district's area. Facilitators coped with damaged roads and absent mobile signal by taking detours and relaying information through neighbouring beneficiaries. Allocating facilitators by village and caseload, without regard to terrain, produces spatial inequality that shifts part of programme communication onto recipients.
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